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Regulatory choices in Communication Governance
MICHAEL LATZER
Governance as modified research perspective
The growing use of governance concepts in the communication field in-
dicates a modified research perspective that stresses the importance of
institutions in communication policy research, and extends the tradi-
tional focus on national government in two directions:
(1) Horizontally, it includes the role of private actors in regulation, the
remix of state, and private contributions in communications regula-
tion;
(2) Vertically, it incorporates the multi-level character of regulation, the
interplay of national regulation with international, supranational,
regional, and local regulation.
Both extensions are important in order to assess recent changes in com-
munication regulation triggered by liberalization and globalization, to
grasp the changing and diminishing role of nation states, and to advise
policy makers on their regulatory choices between different modes of
regulation in convergent markets.
This paper focuses on the regulatory part of governance, defined as
intentional constraints on market players. Further, it centers on the
growing horizontal extension of government in communications, which
is indicated by the increasing incidence of self- and co-regulation, sum-
marized in this paper as alternative modes of regulation1. These less
formalized means of regulation are not new phenomena in communica-
tions regulation. However, empirical research shows that there is a grow-
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ing reliance on such alternative forms of regulation, which are carried
out partly, or even entirely, by private regulatory institutions (see Latzer,
Just, Saurwein, and Slominsky, 2006; PCMLP, 2004; Schulz and Held,
2004). They are gaining importance at all levels of multi-level governance
regimes, and their application is encouraged by political institutions, for
instance by the European Commission (see COM, 2001: 428; COM,
2002: 278). Early applications of self- and co-regulation in the communi-
cations sector have been predominantly in technical areas and in media-
content regulation. The greatest reliance on the latter form of regulation
within the communications sector can be found in the regulation of print
media (see Suhr, 1998; Nordenstreng, 1999), whereas in telecommunica-
tions and broadcasting there has always been a stronger reliance on the
statutory legal basis and state actors. However, a sharp increase in self-
regulation occurred in the 1990s, triggered by the Internet boom. Many
single-issue institutions have been founded that are mainly active in ex-
post enforcement measures and in rule making. They usually intervene
after problems have occurred and lack strict powers of sanction (see
Latzer, Just, Saurwein and Slominsky, 2006).
Regulatory choice as institutional choice
Growing reliance on alternative modes of regulation not only raises the
question of why alternative regulation is introduced, but also on how to
decide on the adequate mix of state and alternative regulation from a
public-policy perspective.
Regarding the first question, two ideal-type explanations can be distin-
guished: Private actors are involved in public regulation as makeshift
solution or as ideal solution to regulatory problems. It is a makeshift
solution if traditional state regulation fails, for example in the case of
transborder regulatory problems, when political actors do not have
much option but to apply alternative modes of regulation. Otherwise, if
nation states have an effective choice between different regulatory forms,
self- and co-regulation may be chosen as an ideal solution. The reasons
are the expected advantages over state regulation from a public-policy
point of view, for example better know-how within the industry, reduced
regulatory cost, faster decisions, and more flexible solutions2. Alongside
these incentives from a public-policy perspective, the major incentive
from an industry point of view for a voluntary introduction of self-
regulation is to pre-empt state regulation. Accordingly, self-regulation is
rather introduced and effectively enforced in areas where governments
have the potential to impose state regulation. In other words, ‘carrot
and stick’ strategies will work if the public stick capacity is high, if gov-
ernments can convincingly ‘threaten’ to use ‘big guns’ (command-and-
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control regulations) if the industry does not solve regulatory problems
by means of self-regulation (see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 19 ff.).
From a public-policy point of view, self- and co-regulation cannot
completely replace traditional state intervention. Nevertheless, alterna-
tive modes of regulation may be an effective way to complement state
regulation. State intervention might only be needed as a temporary and
supplementary remedial action (see Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999).
The effectiveness and efficiency of regulation depends to a large extent
on the interplay between the different forms of regulation on the contin-
uum between state and market.
The question of how to find an adequate mix can be conceptualized
as part of a multistage regulatory choice process. The plurality of public
and private norm-setting actors and a plurality of norms, ranging from
classical command-and-control-regulations (laws) to various forms of
‘soft law’ and voluntary agreements, are preconditions for regulatory
choice (see Schuppert, 2005: 398). The institutional choices regarding the
adequate regulatory arrangement cannot be applied across the board for
the whole communications sector, but need to be applied on a case-by-
case basis for any specific regulatory problem. A rough guideline for
the systematic search for a suitable regulatory institutional arrangement,
which builds on theoretical reasoning and experiences with various
modes of regulation, is summarized in Figure 1. It is structured by con-
secutive questions, which are to be discussed in order to choose the regu-
latory arrangements. Policy makers may use it either for ex-ante assess-
ments of regulatory problems at issue, or for ex-post evaluations of al-
ready existing policy solutions. Because the primary interest of this
analysis is in the changing role of the state, the guideline centers on
choices regarding the institutional dimension of regulatory mechanisms,
which shows by whom (actors) and how (processes) regulation is carried
out, and not on the substantive dimension, which asks what is being
regulated (e. g., access, prices)3.
As a first step, it is to be decided whether market intervention is
deemed necessary at all. A list of regulatory objectives of communica-
tions policy, including both cultural and economic goals, makes it pos-
sible to systematically discuss the need for market intervention4. Regula-
tion theories, in particular normative theories of regulation, prove help-
ful in this respect.
After the identification of the guiding objectives and the decision on
the necessity of market intervention, it has to be clarified whether there
is a capacity to act, that is, if the state is in a position to choose between
different regulatory forms. The state’s ability to choose between regula-
tory mechanisms could be high on national level but low on the interna-
tional level, and it could be high in norm setting but low in sanctioning.
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What regulatory objectives are at stake?
Are market interventions necessary to achieve these objectives?
• Cultural and economic objectives
• Theories of regulation
! If interventions are deemed necessary
How high is the state’s capacity to act – the ability to choose between modes
of regulation?
Two dimensions to be discussed:
• Within the various levels of a multi-level-governance regime
• Within the regulatory process (norm-setting, ex-ante/ex-post enforcement, sanc-
tioning)
!
How big is the need for state intervention?
How appropriate are alternative modes of regulation?
Criteria to be discussed:
• Risk of regulatory failure
• Required intensity of regulatory intervention
• Conflicts between public and private interests
• Differences in market power of the companies involved
• Reputation-sensitivity of the industry to regulation
• Recognized organization that could take over the regulatory task
! If self- or co-regulation is chosen
How are alternative modes of regulation instituted?
Success factors to be discussed:
• Operational objectives and clearly defined responsibilities
• Transparent regulatory processes and measurable results
• Defined fall-back scenarios in case of malfunctioning
• Adequate sanction powers
• Periodical reviews and external control by the general public and the state
• Participation possibilities for interested stakeholders
Figure 1. Regulatory choices as institutional choices – a guideline for its systematic dis-
cussion.
Hence, the question of the state’s options regarding modes of regulation
should be discussed systematically on two dimensions: for the various
levels of the multi-level governance regime and for the regulatory process,
that is, for norm setting, ex-ante/ex-post enforcement and sanctioning.
If the opportunities for state intervention are low, there might be no
other choice (makeshift solution) but to rely on self-regulation and on
private actors. Even in this case, the state has some remaining options
to control the development. For example, it could initiate and promote
alternative regulations and it could take part in self-regulation, either
with financial or personal contributions. Otherwise, if the regulatory op-
tions are high, then a rational choice (ideal solution) could be made re-
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garding the extent of alternative regulation, which uses the potential
benefits from its advantages over state regulation as listed above, and
avoids possible disadvantages of alternative regulations, for example a
symbolic policy with weak standards, ineffective enforcement and mild
sanctions, regulatory capture, and insufficient democratic quality.
The appropriateness of alternative modes of regulation from a public-
policy perspective can be discussed based on a list of criteria deduced
from theoretical and empirical research. Alternative regulation may be
appropriate or the necessity for state involvement may be low:
! if the risk of regulatory failure is low;
! if only a low intensity of regulatory intervention is required;
! if there are no strong conflicts between public and private interests;
! if there are no strong differences in market power of the companies
involved;
! if the reputation-sensitivity of the regulation to the industry is high;
! if there is an already recognized organization that could take over the
regulatory task.
Some examples illustrate the application of the criteria listed5. Risks of
regulatory failure are high, for instance, if it results in detrimental effects
on the functioning of the infrastructure, or if it entails high economic
cost, as in the case of spam mail. For the regulation of market transpar-
ency, the risk of failure is rather low. The intensity of regulatory interven-
tion can be considered as high if there are existential effects on market
players involved, as in the example of interconnection regulations. For
market transparency measures it can be assessed as low. The reputation-
sensitivity to regulations can be evaluated by taking a look at the effects
of non-compliance with these regulations. If the non-compliance to a
regulation (e. g., regarding consumer protection) results in a loss of repu-
tation and consequently in falling sales figures, then the reputation-sensi-
tivity can be considered to be high.
Regarding the applicability of this checklist, it should be kept in mind
that it will not always be possible to deal with all criteria, and sometimes
an assessment may lead to contradictory results regarding the choice of
regulatory mechanisms. In the case of spam, for example, the risk of
regulatory failure is high and at the same time the market is charac-
terized by high reputation-sensitivity. While the former indicates the
need for stronger state involvement, the latter indicates the appropriate-
ness of self- and co-regulation. Hence, a balanced mix of state and alter-
native modes of regulation might be the result of an evaluation that also
takes into account the interplay between criteria and the degree of inten-
sity of each particular criterion.
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After the decision on the use of alternative modes of regulation, some
choices remain to be made regarding their institutional specifics. From
a public interest perspective, there are several success factors to be as-
sessed (see Campbell, 1999). For example, defined fallback-scenarios in
the case of malfunctioning, transparent regulatory processes, periodic
reviews, options for stakeholder participation, and adequate sanctions.
Concluding remarks
This paper centered on regulatory choices as institutional choices. It
took full account of the changed research perspective of governance and
recent developments in the convergent communications sector, for exam-
ple the growing reliance on self- and co-regulation. Various theoretical
and empirical research results on communications governance, in par-
ticular on different modes of state and alternative regulation, were bun-
dled in a rough guideline, which is intended to assist policy-makers either
in ex-ante assessments of upcoming regulatory problems or in the ex-
post evaluation of policy choices regarding the institutional regulatory
arrangements. It goes without saying that any specific regulatory choice
in the end remains a political decision, that there are no one-size-fits-all
solutions, and that the guideline is not a technocratic formula that can
mechanically be applied. Further empirical and comparative research
will make it possible to gradually refine the guideline, thus contributing
to strengthening the link between communication policy research and
policymaking, often being criticized as too weak.
Notes
1. The paper builds on Latzer, Just, Saurwein and Slominsky (2002, 2003, 2006); Just,
Latzer and Saurwein (2007).
2. For potential advantages and disadvantages see Boddewyn (1988); Ayres and
Braithwaite (1992); Ogus (1995); Campbell (1999); NCC (2000).
3. For an analysis of regulatory choice that centers on the substantive dimension, see
Schuppert (2006: 395 ff.).
4. For a structured overview of regulatory goals in the convergent communications
sector, see Latzer, Just, Saurwein and Slominski (2002: 105).
5. For a systematic application of this check list on selected regulatory topics (in-
terconnection, market transparency, spam) see Latzer, Just, Saurwein, and Slomin-
ski (2002: 152 ff.); Just, Latzer, and Saurwein (2007).
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The state as a key success factor
for Self-Regulation? Empirical evidence in brief
MATTHIAS KÜNZLER
Introduction
The necessity of the state’s involvement in self-regulation is a controver-
sial issue in the debate about Governance. As Puppis (earlier in this
section) mentioned, the role of the state varies across the six domains of
media governance, but there are hardly any empirical studies about the
question whether a state’s involvement is a key success factor for self-
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